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Abstract 
We propose a typology of lies that distinguishes six kinds of these in terms of beneficiary 
(self, Pareto, other) and motivation (protective vs. beneficial). We gathered data from a daily 
diary study (N = 81). Distinct individual differences were related to specific types of lies, 
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showcasing the importance of distinguishing between types of lies. Low self-esteem, high 
anxiety, and high Machiavellianism involved frequent use of beneficial lies. Conversely, 
protective lies were negatively related to Machiavellianism and positively to empathy. Self-
oriented beneficial lies were related positively to Machiavellianism in particular. Empathy 
was related to the use of other-oriented protective lies. These results give new insight into the 
processes that trigger lies and help to integrate and structure research on lying.  
Keywords: lies; lying; self-other; regulatory focus; individual differences 
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Are self-oriented lies a homogeneous type of deception? Consider the example of a 
man saying that he doesn’t mind staying late at work and doing extra hours when in fact he is 
very tired and simply does it not to lose his job; and then consider another man that claims he 
possesses the qualities necessary to get a promotion, though in reality he lacks them. The 
beneficiary of the lie in both cases is the liar, yet the motivation to lie fundamentally differs. 
We propose that everyday lies are considerably heterogeneous. In particular, we 
advance and test conceptual distinctions between lies on the basis of (a) their beneficiary and 
(b) their motivational underpinnings. The typology of lies initially draws on promotion and 
prevention dimensions in self-regulation (Higgins, 1997; 1998) and existing research of lie 
differentiation (e.g., DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Erat & Gneezy, 
2011). Our model effectively distinguishes between protective and beneficial lies, and 
between lies that serve the self, others, or the collective. By extension, our proposed model 
makes connections between lying behavior, self-regulatory processes, individual differences, 
and the negotiation of social relations. This contributes to a better and more nuanced 
understanding of the psychological and social functions of this frequent yet controversial 
behavior. We first review literature that provides a basis and demonstrate the need for our 
typology of lies. 
The Psychology of Lying 
Lying is a particular form of dishonesty where people “intentionally try to mislead 
someone” (DePaulo et al.,, 1996, p.981; Ekman, 1985). The act of lying typically serves as an 
instrument to achieve a goal that seems difficult to achieve otherwise (Miller & Stiff, 1993). 
Although lying is common (DePaulo et al., 1996), people normatively disapprove of it (Erat 
& Gneezy, 2011; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009) and tend to avoid 
situations that enable dishonesty (Shalvi, Handgraaf, & DeDreu, 2011). The result of this 
social and internalized disapproval of lying is that doing so is psychologically costly to 
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people. For example, a discovered lie is a serious interpersonal trust violation that is 
notoriously difficult to restore (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and liars risk failure 
to live up to their ideal selves (e.g., perceiving oneself as a decent person; Mazar & Ariely, 
2006). Nonetheless, people are tempted to lie when doing so offers benefits that could not be 
achieved by truthful means. Essentially, people weight the costs and benefits of lying to 
decide whether or not to do so (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).  
Important individual differences exist in people’s inclinations to lie (Halevy, Shalvi, & 
Verschuere, 2014; Hall, Park, Song, & Cody, 2010). For example, those who are more 
manipulative, sociable, and concerned with their self-presentation tend to lie more often 
(Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). Likewise, Machiavellianism is positively related to the frequency 
of lying (Giammarco, Atkinson, Baughman, Veselka, & Vernon, 2013; Porter, ten Brinke, 
Baker, & Wallace, 2011), whereas psychopathy and narcissism predict a perceived greater 
ability to lie effectively (Giammarco et al., 2013). Attachment-related anxiety is related to 
telling more everyday lies to strangers and best friends, whereas people with an avoidance 
attachment style (ibidem) lie more often to their romantic partners (Ennis et al., 2008). 
Clearly, lying behavior greatly varies from person to person. 
Towards a Typology of Lies 
Individual differences exist in general lying propensity. Furthermore, the relationships 
between individual differences and lying behavior also vary across contexts (e.g. Baughman, 
Jonason, Lyons, & Vernon, 2014; Jonason et al., 2014; McLeod & Genereux, 2008). For 
example, the probability of lying is strongly related to psychopathy in the mating context, 
whereas Machiavellianism plays this role in the academic context (Baughman et al., 2014). 
The reason why certain individual differences involve more lying in one context but not in 
another is rooted in the existence of different types of lies. For example, Machiavellianism is 
associated with telling white lies (Jonason et al., 2014) and, together with narcissism, 
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increases self-centered lying (lying strictly for one’s own benefit). On the other hand, 
Machiavellianism does not correlate with telling lies that serve other people (Jonason et al., 
2014; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996).  
Clearly, the relation between individual differences and lying is not homogeneous, as 
there are different underlying motives for lying. These vary as a function of the characteristics 
of lies, indicating that distinguishing between types of lies is important in understanding their 
psychological significance. Although researchers have proposed a select range of lie types 
(e.g., Cantarero, Szarota, Stamkou, Navas, & Dominguez Espinosa, 2017; DePaulo et al., 
1996), a comprehensive model that organizes types of lies is lacking. However, there is 
precedent for characterizing lies according to their underlying motivations and beneficiary 
(Arcimowicz, Cantarero, & Soroko, 2015; Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984). For example, 
the desire to acquire gains and the unwillingness to face a loss are argued to be factors that 
can tempt people to lie (e.g., Arcimowicz, Cantarero, & Soroko, 2015; Ekman, 1997). 
Likewise, lies that serve the self are viewed differently than lies that serve others (Lindskold 
& Walters, 1983). Yet, a formal typology of lies that incorporates different beneficiaries and 
motivations has not been developed and tested. 
Differentiation by Beneficiary 
There are different ways to conceptualize types of lies, and perhaps the most useful 
criterion is to use the beneficiary of the lie as a distinguishing characteristic. DePaulo et al. 
(1996) distinguish self-oriented from other-oriented lies, where the interests of either the liar 
or other(s) are taken into consideration. To be more precise: self-oriented lies are “told to 
protect or enhance the liars psychologically or to advantage or protect the liars interests” 
(Kashy & DePaulo, 1996, p. 1042). Other-oriented lies serve instead to benefit not the liar but 
another person. Erat and Gneezy (2011) describe a third type of lie termed Pareto lies. These 
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lies are aimed at helping both the liar and others. These lies are found to be used more often 
than altruistic lies, at least among children (Glatzle-Rutzler & Lergetporer, 2015). 
The majority of lies benefit the self (Camden & Motley, 1984). Self-centered lies less 
often involve faking positive feelings than other-oriented lies (DePaulo et al., 1996). These 
other-oriented lies have an intriguing biological foundation: an increase in oxytocin – a 
hormone implicated in social bonding (Panksepp, 1992) – is related to more dishonesty for the 
benefit of a group (Shalvi & De Dreu, 2014). People are willing to engage in telling a Pareto 
lie to a lesser extent than telling a lie that benefits another person while being unfavorable for 
the liar (Erat & Gneezy, 2011). Interestingly, research by Lindskold and Walters (1983) is 
aligned with this distinction; they showed that people find lies aimed at protecting others to be 
the most acceptable, while lies that bring benefits to the liar while hurting another person are 
the least acceptable. In the same vein, research by Wiltermuth (2011) showed that because 
other-oriented dishonesty is seen as far more acceptable, cheating increases when people have 
a chance to indicate bringing benefits to others as a factor that influences their dishonesty. 
Furthermore, Weisel and Shalvi (2015) showed that collaboration, especially when the profits 
are similar to both parties, leads to higher levels of dishonesty. Overall, these findings suggest 
that the decision of whether to be honest or not is influenced by the person (or people) to 
whom the lie is supposed to bring benefits, among others. 
Differentiation by Motivation 
Besides differentiating lies in terms of their beneficiary, we propose a second 
important distinction: lying to obtain a desirable outcome versus lying to prevent an 
undesirable outcome. This novel proposal draws from regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; 
1998) and applies it to the context of lying behavior; there are good reasons to anticipate that 
such a distinction further qualifies lying behavior.  
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 According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998), the pursuit of goals as 
part of self-regulation processes can be characterized by two motivational approaches: a 
promotion focus involves the pursuit of positive outcomes (e.g., obtaining gains); a prevention 
focus involves attempting to thwart negative outcomes (e.g., preventing losses). The foci 
discussed by Higgins (1997) include two end-state reference points, one for each regulatory 
focus. The desired end-state reference point for promotion focus is accomplishment, while for 
prevention focus it is safety. Danger is the undesired end-state point of reference for 
prevention focus and unfulfillment for the promotion focus. These foci vary both as a function 
of personality as well as context (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) and exert a profound influence on 
self-regulation behavior across domains (Higgins & Spiegel, 2004). 
Why would regulatory focus be an important characteristic of lies? First of all, the 
social norms governing lying acceptance appear to vary between lies that could be labelled 
protective lies (prevention focused) and beneficial lies (promotion focused). Specifically, 
people find lies aimed at protection from harm more acceptable than lies that are aimed at 
gaining benefits (Lindskold & Walters, 1983). Consequently, the cost/benefit analysis that 
governs the decision to lie likely varies between protective and beneficial lies, with the former 
being associated with fewer personal and interpersonal costs. Second, researchers have found 
tentative evidence of a prevention/promotion distinction in lie types. Importantly, framing 
effects were found on dishonesty: people are more prone to cheat when the outcome is 
perceived as a loss than when it is framed in the gain domain (Folmer & De Cremer, 2012; 
Grolleau, Kocher, & Sutan, 2016). Additionally, Cole (2001) concluded that lying in romantic 
relationship is, among other reasons, related to avoiding punishment. Ekman (1997) also 
pointed out that the motivation to avoid punishment is mentioned most frequently as the 
motive for lying. Ekman argued that lies can in part be characterized as motivated by loss 
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aversion (including protection of the status quo). This suggests that a promotion versus 
prevention focus can be a fundamental basis for differentiating lying behavior. 
Applying these orientations to telling the truth and lying shows how the decision 
whether to lie or tell the truth can be driven by different motivations (Table 1). Reaching the 
desired end-states is possible by using both truthful means and deception. Should reaching 
these points be impossible by truthful means, people can then resort to lying to achieve them.  
 
Table 1 
Two types of motivational focus of lying. The table is based on the illustration of different 
approach-avoidance orientations presented in: Higgins, 1997, p. 1297 
 Regulatory reference 
Motivation focus, two types 
of lies and their short-term 
consequences 
Desired end-state reference 
point 
Undesired end-state reference 
point 
Gain Accomplishment Nonfulfillment 
Beneficial lies I lie because it allows me to 
gain X.  
I gain less than X because I did not 
lie.  
Short-term consequences My situation improves. My situation did not improve. 
Loss aversion  Safety Danger 
Protective lies I lie not to lose X, to 
maintain status quo.  
I lose something because I did not 
lie.  
Short-term consequences My situation stays the same. My situation worsens. 
 
Beneficial lies are aimed at providing gains at least in a short-term. That is, telling 
such lies is plausible when a liar perceives them as an opportunity to acquire additional 
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profits, material or psychological. Should a person refrain from such a lie, they may view 
their situation as not having improved. Thus, a desire to improve the current situation serves 
as cause for beneficial lies, while refraining from lying means missing a chance to gain. 
Consistently, studies by Effron, Bryan, and Murninghan (2015) show that anticipated regret is 
related to dishonesty (the cheat-at-the-end effect). Protective lies differ from beneficial ones. 
People are more likely to use a protective lie when they perceive a situation as threatening to 
their present state. The threat does not have to be understood only as a physical one, but can 
be of a different, including psychological, nature. Not lying in such instances involves the risk 
of worsening the situation. Therefore, using a protective lie can be seen as reaching for a last 
resort, whereas using a beneficial lie is more proactive and aimed at providing additional 
gains. 
Lies are told to bring positive outcomes (which include both gains and loss aversion) 
that cannot be reached by truthful means (Miller & Stiff, 1993). Long-term consequences of 
lies of the two types of motivations should depend highly on whether a lie is discovered or 
not. It is probable that the consequences for both protective and beneficial lies are similar to 
short-term consequences when the lie goes undiscovered. Should the truth be revealed, 
however, it ought to result in different consequences for the liar. Research shows that people 
show more understanding for lies that are aimed at protection than at bringing benefits 
(Lindskold & Walters, 1983). A beneficial lie should then entail much more severe 
consequences and result in worsening the liar’s situation. A protective lie, on the other hand, 
should be perceived as more understandable and not so severely punished. As a consequence, 
the benefits from an uncovered lie should be greater in case of beneficial lies, while the loss 
when a lie is exposed should be greater in the case of beneficial lies.  
Adding this motivational dimension is important for understanding the phenomenon of 
lying. It shows that lies aimed at one type of beneficiary can vary significantly and that this 
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difference has further implications. Protective and beneficial lies are not driven by the same 
type of motivation, and as a consequence individual differences can explain the differences in 
the use of these lies in everyday life. 
Lie Types and Predictions 
Together, this categorization based on beneficiary (self-oriented vs other-oriented vs 
Pareto) and motivation (regulatory focus of promotion and prevention, i.e., willingness to gain 
vs loss aversion) creates six types of lies (Figure 1). Self-oriented beneficial lies are 
characterized by the pursuit of positive outcomes for the self (e.g., falsely claiming that a 
found sum of money is one’s own). Self-oriented protective lies, on the other hand, are 
directed at avoiding a negative self-outcome (e.g., falsely denying that one has broken a 
valuable vase). Beneficial other-oriented lies are directed at securing positive outcomes for 
others (e.g., falsely telling a child that his drawing is the most beautiful in the world), whereas 
protective other-oriented lies are characterized by attempts to prevent harm to befall another 
person (e.g., falsely telling another person that she will most likely find her lost wallet). 
Beneficial Pareto lies tend to benefit both the liar and someone else (falsely claiming a prize 
for one’s team). Finally, protective Pareto lies are characterized by attempts to prevent harm 
coming to oneself and another person (e.g., falsely claiming that you and your friends were 
not responsible for organizing last year’s failed Christmas party). 
The benefit of our typology of lies is that it clarifies an important part of the 
psychological process behind lying behavior: beneficiary and motivation. By doing so, it is 
possible to develop predictions about the relationships between individual differences and 
each type of lie. One of the benefits of the resulting model is that it allows to develop 
predictions about who will express specific lies, for example as a function of personality. 
Additionally, the proposed distinction of the types of lies can also serve future studies on 
situational cues that trigger the appearance of a given type of a lie. In the present study we 
Running head: TYPES OF EVERYDAY LIES      12 
 
were interested in seeing whether specific types of lies are used more often by people 
possessing certain personality traits. We tested this at the level of the six specific types, as 
well as for lie types generally grouped by beneficiary or motivation. As part of this empirical 
quest, we correlated lying behavior with the personality variables Machiavellianism, self-
control, social desirability, empathy, self-esteem, and anxiety.  
Machiavellianism 
 Drawing on the results of earlier studies (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996), we predicted that 
Machiavellianism would be positively correlated with more frequent self-oriented lying in 
general. Machiavellianism is often associated with using a variety of unethical or socially 
offensive tactics to achieve power or status (Kaestner, Rosen, Appel, & Sofer, 1977). Low 
Machiavellianism was found to be related to trust reciprocation in a bargaining game 
(Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002). Consistently, we expected that Machiavellian 
participants would be more likely to adopt deceptive communication in their everyday life 
(i.e., self-oriented lies). We expected that Machiavellianism would promote the use of 
beneficial lies in general. Since these lies are aimed at bringing benefits, the goal of these lies 
should serve as a very good reason to resort to lying for those high on Machiavellianism and 
thus they should be especially eager to use beneficial lies. 
 We expected that the main difference when considering our typology of lies would 
emerge between self-oriented beneficial and self-oriented protective lies. Self-oriented 
beneficial lies are likely to be especially related to Machiavellianism as opposed to self-
oriented protective lies. In the case of self-oriented beneficial lies, the manipulative function 
of lying is particularly prominent as these lies facilitate the acquisition of new short-term 
gains. People who are more manipulative are arguably more inclined to use a situation that 
allows them to achieve certain aims, even if they are of a short-term nature. These kinds of 
lies are hence not driven by the aversion of losing something, but by the urge of profiting; one 
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of the best tools for this may be exactly this type of a lie. The use of a beneficial lie should 
thus be more common for people high in Machiavellianism.  
Self-Control 
 Effective self-control involves the ability to restrain from responding with automatic 
impulses and habits in the service of long-term goal attainment (Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004). Self-control relates to lying. For example, ego-depletion, which temporarily 
hampers self-control ability, fosters egoistic lies (Mead et al., 2009). Interestingly, the 
proneness to use other-oriented lies diminishes when self-control resources are limited 
(Cantarero & Van Tilburg, 2014). Accordingly, we expected that higher self-control capacity 
would be associated with a lower tendency to lie in general, but also that higher self-control 
would be linked with the less frequent the use of self-oriented lies and more frequent use of 
other-oriented lies. We made no specific predictions regarding beneficial and protective lies 
and self-control. 
Social Desirability 
Social desirability is a construct related to the way people would like to be seen by 
others (Mazilescu & Gangloff, 2012). It reflects the extent to which people like others to 
approve of them. We predicted that social desirability would be negatively related to the 
willingness to produce self-oriented lies as these are the ones most negatively perceived by 
others (e.g., Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998). Additionally, we predicted that higher 
social desirability would be accompanied by fewer admitted instances of lying. We expected 
this latter effect because participants may refrain from both producing and reporting the 
telling of lies driven by the desire to maintain a positive social image.  
Empathy 
Because empathy involves the ability to understand other people’s views and their 
needs and emotions – which includes the tendency to avoiding harming others – we expected 
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that using other-oriented lies would be related to higher empathy (Carre, Stefaniak, 
D’Ambrosio, Bensalah, & Beshe-Richard, 2013). In this case the goal of the lie is to bring 
benefits to another person (or protect them from harm). More empathic people should be more 
eager to use these lies in order to help others. We made no specific predictions regarding 
empathy and beneficial vs protective lies. 
Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem involves a stable sense of personal worth or worthiness. Induced lower 
self-esteem can promote deceptive behavior aimed at bringing benefits (Aronson & Mettee, 
1968), and we therefore expected such a compensatory tendency in general, leading to an 
association between self-esteem and beneficial lies. We proposed that the lower the self-
esteem, the higher the tendency to use beneficial lies, since they may give a self-esteem boost 
by providing a profit. We anticipated more self-oriented beneficial lies when self-esteem is 
low. More precisely, self-oriented beneficial lies should be related to lower self-esteem, 
allowing these short-term benefits to reach the liar. 
Anxiety 
Since high anxiety is often referred to as feelings of discomfort, nervousness or even 
fear (e.g., Endler & Kocovski, 2001), we anticipated that more beneficial lies are told by those 
high in anxiety. Highly anxious individuals may resort to beneficial lies for various reasons. 
Most of all, as Kashy and DePaulo (1996) argued previously that, as a product of insecurity, 
self-oriented lies can help in claiming a more positive identity. This can be manifested by 
resorting to beneficial lies, when faced with a situation where lying can improve one’s 
situation. Beneficial self-oriented lies can serve as tools helping to create such a situation, 
even if the results are related to only short-term profits. Lower self-esteem and higher anxiety 
may result in proneness to use such beneficial lies, and their function is rather compensatory. 
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That is, they may bring a self-esteem boost or an added value that serves short-term goals, not 
necessarily long-term benefits.  
We conducted a daily diary study to verify the predictions holding that individual 
differences would relate to specific types of lies. 
 The Present Study 
The aim of this study was twofold. First of all, we gathered lies from everyday life 
contexts and tested whether the proposed typology of could be applied to them. Secondly, we 
examined if the individual differences discussed above indeed correlate with particular groups 
or types of lies.  
Method 
Participants and Recruitment 
Eighty-three people (55 women) participated in a study on social interactions at a 
university in Poland. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 64 (M = 29.96, SD = 
12.09). For recruitment, we placed ads in local newspapers and local internet sites. The ads 
specified that we were looking for participants for a social scientific study on social contacts. 
We wrote that the participants’ task would be to keep a diary of certain social interactions, 
mainly conversations, over a period of one week. We assured participants that the research 
would not impede their work and that they would spend about 30 minutes a day on 
participation. Participants were given 130PLN (~€30) for taking part. Two participants 
resigned from the study after the initial informational meeting, resulting in a final sample of 
81 participants.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was adapted from DePaulo et al. (1996). We first held 1.5-2 hour long 
information meetings with groups of up to 11 people during which we explained the study 
procedure. Participants were requested to record their social interactions, their instances of 
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lying, and their reasons for these lies, during a period of one week. They used a small “pocket 
size” paper diary for this purpose. They then uploaded their notes into an online diary. The 
online diary was a web page designed especially for the purposes of the study. Participants 
accessed the online diary using individual logins and passwords, and we encouraged them to 
complete the virtual diary at least once a day. 
To facilitate understanding, we defined “social interactions” in a similar manner as 
DePaulo and colleagues (1996): “By a social interaction we mean any situation in which two 
or more people are involved, and are reacting or responding to one another for a minimum 
duration of ten minutes” (see also Moskowitz & Sadikaj, 2012, p.175). We defined the 
concept of “lies” for them based on Kashy and DePaulo (1996; Ekman, 1991): “A lie occurs 
anytime you intentionally try to mislead someone.” These two definitions were followed by 
various examples and counter-examples (e.g., mistakes rather than lies). Participants were told 
that if they preferred not to describe a lie or not to give the reasons behind it, then they could 
list only essential aspects of it or write “Rather not say”. Participants used the “Rather not 
say” phrase only five times regarding lie description and nine times when it came to stating 
the reasons behind a lie. 
We ensured participants that the data would be used for scientific purposes only and 
they would remain anonymous (anonymous login, passwords that they changed after the first 
login). We assured participants that we were neither promoting not condemning lying; we 
were only interested in the phenomenon from a scientific point of view, and needed their help 
(DePaulo et al., 1996). We did not ask participants to return the diaries after the study. During 
the information meeting, participants were given hard copies of the instructions, definitions, 
and examples. The two definitions and the most important part of the instructions also 
featured in the pocket-size paper diary. 
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At the end of the information session participants completed various individual 
difference measures, described below. During the week, we sent daily reminders to 
participants about filling in the online diary. After logging in, participants could access the 
key definitions and examples as well as the other instructions, and, importantly, were given 
space to report their daily notes.
1
 
Measures 
We assessed Machiavellianism, the tendency to manipulate others to achieve personal 
goals, with a validated Polish translation (Pospiszyl, 2000; Rogoza & Cieciuch, 2018) of the 
Mach IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). This scale consists of 20 statements (e.g., “Never tell 
anyone that the reason you did something unless it is useful to do so”, 1 = totally agree, 7 = 
totally disagree) and yielded sufficient reliability after exclusion of the item “Most men are 
courageous” (α = .70)2.  
Participants next completed the self-control scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 
2004), which consists of 36 items (e.g., “I often interrupt people”, 1 = not like me, 5 = very 
much like me). The scale was translated into Polish using a translation/back-translation 
procedure for the purposes of this study and demonstrated excellent reliability (α = .87). 
We measured people’s tendency to present themselves favorably using the lie scale 
with 12 designated items from the validated Polish version (Jaworowska, 2011) of the 
Eysenck revised personality questionnaire (EPQ-R(S); Eysenck, & Eysenck, 2006). The EPQ-
R(S) lie scale may be viewed as a tool for assessing when a person is “faking good”, but it 
also may indicate social acquiescence or conformity (e.g., Jackson, & Francis, 1999). 
Participants indicated their agreement with 12 statements (e.g., “Have you ever blamed 
                                                          
1
At the end of the week, participants completed other online measures (e.g., self-efficacy) 
related to research questions not examined in the current manuscript. 
2The scale used with the excluded items shows internal consistency of α = .68 and yields 
virtually identical results when used in the analysis. Details available upon request. 
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someone for doing something you knew was really your fault”, yes vs no). The scale achieved 
reliability slightly below the acceptable α = .70 (α = .66), though similar to previous studies 
(e.g., Francis, Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992; Karanci, Dirik, & Yorulmaz, 2007; Tiwari, Singh, 
& Singh, 2009). 
We measured empathy using the Polish version (Jaworowska, 2011) of Eysenck's 
impulsivity inventory (IVE, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1991). The empathy scale consists of 19 
statements (“Do you often get emotionally involved with your friends' problems?”, yes vs no) 
and yielded good reliability (α = .75). 
Next, we measured global self-esteem using the Polish version (Dzwonkowska, 
Lachowicz–Tabaczek, & Łaguna, 2008) of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965). The scale 
contains 5 positively worded (e.g., “I feel I have a number of good qualities”) and 5 
negatively worded (e.g., “At times I think I am no good at all”) items (1 = strongly agree, 4 = 
strongly disagree). The reliability of the scale after recoding negatively worded items was 
good (α = .82).  
A Polish version (Wrześniewski, Sosnowski, Jaworowska, & Fecenec, 2006) of the 
state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was next used to 
measure anxiety, a subjective feeling of tension, apprehension, nervousness, and worry. The 
measure contains 20 state anxiety items (e.g., “I feel upset”, 1 = not at all, 4 = very much so) 
and 20 trait anxiety items (e.g., “I am a steady person”, 1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). 
Both scales were reliable (α = .91, and α = .89, respectively). 
Results 
Our goal was to include three types of beneficiary: 1) self, 2) other, 3) self and other, 
and two types of motivation: 1) gains and 2) loss aversion. In the present study we mainly 
focused on self-oriented lies, however, as these should be the most frequent ones and also 
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because they allow us to show important differences when including individual differences 
and proneness to using specific types of lies of the proposed typology. 
Types of Lies 
Participants reported on an average of 6.62 (SD = 1.01) of the planned 7 days. A total 
of 2,039 interactions were recorded (on average 3.80 per day) and a total of 412 presumed lies 
were recorded (on average 0.74 per day). The proportion of lies per social interaction was 
0.24 (SD = .18). 
The recorded lies were sent to five competent judges, all psychologists, who were 
presented with the definitions of lying and the types of lies, as mentioned previously. The 
judges were asked to read all of the instances of presumed lies and reasons for telling a lie, as 
stated by participants, and were asked to categorize the lies into one of the categories: self-
oriented beneficial lie, self-oriented protective lie, other-oriented beneficial lie, other-
oriented protective lie, Pareto beneficial lie, Pareto protective lie, other, or not a lie. 
Adequate agreement, given the number of categories, existed amongst the judges (overall 
Fleiss’ κ = .45). Based on these five judgments, each lie was assigned to its most frequently 
assigned category. Eleven of the recorded lies were not considered to be lies by the judges and 
were therefore dropped from further analysis. Of the remaining 401 lies, 41% (164 instances) 
were self-oriented protective lies, 19% (77 instances) were self-oriented beneficial lies, 15% 
(61 instances) were other-oriented protective lies, 7% (29 instances) were Pareto protective 
lies, 3% (14 instances) were other-oriented beneficial lies, 2% (9 instances) were Pareto 
beneficial lies, and 12% (47 instances) were other types of lies. The vast majority of lies could 
thus be assigned to one of the categories of the typology of lies, confirming the 
reasonableness of the proposed typology. 
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Types of Lies and Individual Differences 
 Next, we focused on the 354 lies that fell into one of the six main categories. We then 
calculated for each participant the number of lies for each category. We wanted to assess if, 
when people lie, certain types of lies would be used with greater frequency by people 
possessing certain personality characteristics. Following Kashy and DePaulo (1996) we first 
computed the participants’ proportion of lies per social interaction, followed by proportions of 
specific lie types within their total amounts of lies. We subjected these proportions to non-
parametric correlation analyses. The results are summarized in Table 2 in Supplementary 
Materials. 
Machiavellianism.  We found that overall frequency of lying was positively related 
with Machiavellianism at a trend level, rs(81) = .11, p = .159. When we focused on the 
beneficiary only, Machiavellianism was not significantly related to the proportions of self-
oriented lies, rs(71) = .01, p = .454. However, gain versus loss motivation for lying was 
significantly related to this individual difference. People who scored higher on 
Machiavellianism used beneficial lies more often rs(71) = .23, p = .028. The use of protective 
lies was negatively related to Machiavellianism rs(71) = -.20, p = .047. Most importantly, we 
found that the more Machiavellian the participants were, the more often they used self-
oriented beneficial lies rs(71) = .20, p = .046. No such relation with Machiavellianism was 
found for the other types of lies. 
Self-control. Higher levels of self-control among participants were associated with 
fewer lies per social interaction rs(81) = -.25, p = .013. Additionally, the relationship between 
self-control and the use of self-oriented beneficial lies was marginally significant rs(71) = -
.19, p = .057. 
Social desirability. The relationship between lying in general and social desirability 
rs(80) = -.17, p = .063 did not reach statistical significance, indicating only a trend level. 
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Social desirability was negatively related to the proportion of self-oriented lies, rs(71) = -.21, 
p = .037. 
Empathy. The more empathic participants were, the more often they used other-
oriented lies rs(66) = .29, p = .009 and Pareto lies rs(66) = .26, p = .019. Additionally, other-
oriented protective lies were positively related to empathy rs(66) = .21, p = .043. 
Self-esteem. The overall use of lies and the beneficiary of the lie were not statistically 
related to self-esteem. However, lower self-esteem was linked with greater use of beneficial 
lies rs(71) = -.21, p = .042. Additionally, self-oriented beneficial lies were negatively related 
to self-esteem at a trend level, rs(71) = -.15, p = .114. 
Anxiety. Anxiety was positively related to the use of beneficial lies, rs(67) = .22, p = 
.039. There was also a relationship at a trend level between anxiety and the use of self-
oriented beneficial lies, rs(67) = .12, p = .171, and anxiety and the use self-oriented protective 
lies, rs(67) = -.14, p = .131. 
Additionally, the proportion of the use of each type of the six lies was either 
negatively related to the others or was not statistically related, which indicated its 
distinctiveness (Table 3). Spearman correlations between absolute frequencies of the lie types 
also suggested their considerable independence, r range = [-.11, .37]. 
Overall, our results show that the bidimensional matrix of motivation and beneficiary 
of a lie produces a typology that allows differentiation of lies and indicates that the categories 
of these lies relate in a dissimilar way to individual differences.
3
 
                                                          
3
 Gender differences were not the focus of our study, yet we report findings related to sex 
differences and the use of lies to further show the characteristics of the lies. There is mixed 
evidence of the general use of deception depending on gender. On the one hand, there is 
research showing that among children and adolescents gender does not differentiate between 
proneness to deceive (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011). On the other hand, there is research that 
shows that men tend to be less honest when they can benefit from it (e.g., Grosh & Rau, 2017; 
see also Rosenbaum, Billinger, & Stieglitz, 2014 for an overview). There were no differences 
in the overall number of lies per social interaction U = 662.50, p = .429. Men record no other-
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General Discussion 
 We tested a new typology of lies, characterized by the beneficiary of the lie and the 
motivation for lying behavior, which draws on the prevention/promotion regulatory focus. 
Participants maintained a diary of their social interactions and lies for a period of one week. 
We found that the most frequent category of everyday lies are protective self-oriented lies, 
then self-oriented beneficial lies, other-oriented protective, and finally Pareto protective lies. 
This indicates a few things. First of all, not surprisingly the majority of lies serve the liar, 
which is consistent with the notion that the self-interest norm influences people’s behavior 
(Miller, 1999). That is, people act to maximize their own interest and self-oriented lies enable 
reaching this goal when truthful means fail to do so. Second of all, protective lies appear more 
frequently than beneficial lies, which may relate to the fact that the regulatory reference for 
these lies is safety and danger. This means that should an individual not resort to using such a 
protective lie, they will incur the risk of losing something. This result is consistent with 
findings that people in general avoid losses, and that losses have a bigger impact than gains 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Furthermore, a loss frame results in a higher probability 
of cheating than a gain frame (Folmer & De Cremer, 2012; Grolleau, Kocher, & Sutan, 2016; 
Kern & Chugh, 2009). For this reason, the most frequent appearance of protective self-
oriented lies protects the two motives: of the self-interest norm and loss aversion. Our results 
support the notion that the tendency to approach gains versus avoid losses serves as a helpful 
tool when describing the motivation to lie.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
oriented beneficial lies nor Pareto beneficial lies. There were no significant differences as far 
as the use of other of the six types of lies are concerned. There were no significant differences 
in the use of aggregated promotion and protective lies by men and women. There were 
significant differences in the use of other-oriented lies. Men (M = .11, SD = .17, Mdn = 0) 
used them less frequently then women (M = .24, SD = .24, Mdn = .20), U = 526.50, z = -2.26, 
p = .024, r = -.25. There were no differences in the use of self-oriented and Pareto lies. These 
calculations were based on the proportion of the lies of a given category per overall number of 
interactions and not on the raw number of lies. 
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The results of our study showed that the overall number of lies per social interactions 
was negatively correlated with self-control. This confirms that lying relates to the ability to 
control one’s impulses. We did not find a significant relationship between self-control and 
other-oriented lies, nor between self-control and self-oriented lies, though the direction of the 
relationship was as predicted. It is possible that when the beneficiary of the liar is included, 
situational influences on self-control may override dispositions. Indeed, previous studies show 
that situational depletion of self-control resources relates to self-oriented and other-oriented 
lies (Mead et al., 2009; Cantarero & Van Tilburg, 2014). Though the use of lies in general is 
related to dispositional self-control, the propensity to use more specific types of lies may be 
more related to situational than dispositional self-control resources.  
Social desirability was negatively related to the use of self-oriented lies. This is 
consistent with the finding that these lies are more negatively viewed than other-oriented lies 
(Lindskold & Walters, 1983), which results in a weakened propensity to produce these lies by 
those who are especially eager to be perceived in a more favorable way. This result can also 
indicate that participants high on social desirability were less willing to report such lies. We 
found that empathy was related to a higher proneness to use both other-oriented and Pareto 
lies. There was also a positive correlation between protective lies and empathy, yet when the 
beneficiary of the lie was included, only the use of other-oriented and not self-oriented 
protective lies relates to empathy. This indicates that when a lie involves the interests of 
others, individuals who show a concern for others will be more eager to bear the costs of 
deviating from the truth. These results are consistent with findings showing that other-
oriented lies are much different from the more prototypical self-oriented lies. People evaluate 
other-oriented lies as less of a lie than egoistic lies (Cantarero & Szarota, 2017). The former 
are even found to be more ethical than truth telling (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). At the 
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interpersonal level, other-oriented lies can even breed benevolence-based trust (Levine & 
Schweitzer, 2015).  
Lower self-esteem and higher anxiety related most strongly to greater use of beneficial 
lies. This may reflect that the role played by these lies is rather compensational, unlike with 
the use of protective lies. This finding supports the previously argued notion that one function 
of lies is to enable creation of a more impressive identity (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). We 
showed that this is the case regarding beneficial lies, and not protective lies. Lies serve as a 
tool for achieving certain goals. Beneficial lies can enable additional gains and these may 
serve, among others, as means to acquire a more impressive identity. This finding is 
interesting and could benefit from more research in the future. Research by Lee, Gino, Jin, 
Rice, and Josephs (2015) indicates that the interaction of both high testosterone and high 
cortisol relates to higher probability to cheat in order to receive higher monetary gains. This 
finding is in line with our notion that beneficial lies have a compensatory function. The 
authors additionally show that the more participants cheated, the greater the decrease was in 
cortisol and negative affect after cheating; this indicates that acquiring new gains through 
deception brings additional short-term benefits to experiencing high stress levels, namely, 
reduction of stress and negative affect. These results also suggest a compensatory-like 
function of cheating to acquire gains.  
As expected, the results showed that the more Machiavellian individuals were, the 
more they used beneficial lies. This supports our view that these lies differ importantly from 
protective lies. A beneficial lie is used though one does not have to (but wants to), whereas a 
protective lie is used when one has to (but does not want to). In this way, lying to acquire 
additional gains is more common for those who think that the ends justify the means. 
Furthermore, Machiavellianism was negatively related to the use of protective lies, indicating 
that the nature of these lies is far from manipulative. Machiavellianism was also positively 
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related to the use of self-oriented beneficial lies and not self-oriented protective lies, or self-
oriented lies in general. The lack of a relationship between Machiavellianism and the 
proportion of self-oriented lies may reflect that not only the type of beneficiary of the lie is 
important in relation to this trait, but that the type of motivation should also be included to 
obtain a more precise understanding of the phenomenon.  
We emphasize that our goal was to derive a typology of lies using regulatory foci as 
guiding principle, yet we do not see them as a straightforward reflection of the Regulatory 
Focus Theory. Most of all, anxiety relates to beneficial and protective lying in a different way 
than in promotion versus prevention regulatory focus (e.g., Klenk, Strauman, & Higgins, 
2011). The promotion regulatory focus is said to be the result of nurturing caretaking of a 
child, whereas prevention regulation results from the presence or absence of situations with 
negative outcomes (Higgins, 1996; Manian, Papadakis, Strauman, & Essex, 2006). Research 
shows that the relationship between promotion focus and anxiety is negative (e.g. Kolanczyk, 
Bak, & Roczniewska, 2013). The presence of anxiety is said to inhibit the appearance of 
promotion focus aimed at reaching positive outcomes. In the case of deviations from truth, 
however, the more proactive, promotional attitude regarding lying is theorized to be related 
positively with anxiety, as stated previously. Our goal is to apply given aspects of regulatory 
focus theory to lying. The decision whether to lie or tell the truth is very different from a 
decision involving a choice between two truthful acts. For this reason, we do not see 
beneficial and protective lies as a direct application of promotion and prevention focus. We do 
think, however, that the aspect of aiming at acquiring gains and protecting from losses by 
using lying are important factors regarding the phenomenon of lying. 
 There are a few limitations to our research. First of all, the research was based on 
declarative data. Though we tried to ensure conditions in which participants would feel safe 
and the quality of the data was high, it should be taken into consideration that when the 
Running head: TYPES OF EVERYDAY LIES      26 
 
gathered data does not enjoy social acceptance, situations where participants do not provide 
true data might occur. Nevertheless, previous studies have showed that self-reports on lying 
and ethical risk taking are indeed positively related with real-life cheating (Halevy, Shalvi, & 
Verschuere, 2014; Zimerman, Shalvi, & Bereby-Meyer, 2014). The lack of relation between 
the frequency of lying and the lie scale may indicate that participants were not so driven by 
the urge to hide or misrepresent data. Another argument that speaks in favor of “truthfulness 
of the gathered lies” is the fact that the vast majority of the lies we gathered were self-oriented 
lies. Should participants be driven by the sole need to present themselves in a desired way, 
they would probably refrain from reporting so many of these lies. We can only assume that 
the factual number of lies (especially self-oriented lies) could simply be higher. We did, 
however, obtain very similar results to DePaulo et al. (1996) as far as proportion of lies to 
social interactions is concerned, which elevates our confidence in the reliability of the results.  
In the conducted study we measured individual differences only once. This did not 
allow us to control for possible subtle variations of individual differences (e.g., Robinson, 
2009). Although individual differences like self-control, self-esteem, or Machiavellianism are 
quite consistent over time (see e.g., Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; Trzesniewski, 
Donellan, & Robins, 2003; Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002), future studies could 
benefit from including repeated measures of individual differences. Finally, we acknowledge 
that the sample size of this study is not large. Future studies focused on the proposed typology 
could benefit from larger samples and diverse methodological approaches. 
 Individual differences are an important but not sole contributor to lying behavior. 
Research on situational determinants has also provided valuable insight on circumstances that 
are “dishonesty triggers” (e.g. Grover & Hui, 2005; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). 
Doubtlessly, future experimental designs could provide us with more profound insight on the 
proposed typology of lies. It would be useful to define the circumstances in which a given 
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type of a lie may occur and what other individual differences may be related to proneness to 
use a given type of lie. It is difficult to include all the psychological variables that could be 
related to chosen types of lies in one project. We think that future studies could focus on 
personality traits or other psychological variables that may be related to other-oriented 
beneficial and protective lies, as well as Pareto protective and Pareto beneficial lies. Both 
short-term and long-term consequences of beneficial and protective lies may also be a fruitful 
area for new research. Future studies can verify in a cross-cultural setting whether the 
frequency of the different types of lies is robust across cultures. There are cross-cultural 
differences in the acceptance of different types of lies (e.g., Cantarero et al., 2017). 
Additionally, results show that in cultures with higher rates of corruption, tax evasion, and 
fraudulent politics, people tend to deceive more than in countries where rule violations are 
low (Gaechter & Schultz, 2016). It would be interesting to see if the proportion of the use of 
beneficial lies to protective lies changes as a function of the prevalence of rule violations in a 
country. What is more, research shows that there are individual differences related to a 
general tendency to behave dishonestly. For example, the honesty-humility factor was found 
to relate to a general propensity to engage in dishonest behavior (Hilbig & Zettler, 2015). 
Future studies may test whether the typology of lies we propose and its relation to individual 
differences may be extended to dishonesty in general.  
Our typology of lies gives a more detailed categorization of lies. What is more, the 
gathered data support the two-dimensional framework that produces six types of lies. This 
new approach to categorization of lying shows that it is not only lying in general that should 
be related to certain individual characteristics, but that this relation is more complex. To 
obtain a more precise and accurate picture of the relation between individual differences and 
lying, lies of different types of motivation and beneficiary are taken into consideration. Our 
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pioneering model helps to approach the study of lies more systematically and to formulate 
more nuanced hypotheses. 
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Figure 1. Types of lies in everyday life depending on the motivation of the liar and the 
beneficiary 
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